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Administration's dealings with the ICC will lead to more instability around the world and intensify resentment at what is perceived as U.S. unilateralism. As this highly publicized debate unfolds on the international stage, the impact on U.S. national security decision-making and the future shaping of our military engagement strategy could be significant.
The primary focus of this paper is to address the key issues associated with the creation of the ICC and its impact on U.S. national security decision making and the current and future role of the United States military in international affairs.
As this paper will demonstrate, the United States always supported the principles of establishing a permanent international criminal court. This paper will address five key areas. First, it will outline the U.S. principles relating to the creation of an 'international criminal court.' Second, it will address U.S. policy issues, concerns and objections regarding the ICC. Third, it will review current U.S. policy regarding the ICC and the international community. Fourth, it will analyze the impact of the ICC on U.S.
national security decision making and the potential impact on current and future U.S. military operations -with a focus on peacekeeping operations, current military operations in Iraq and U.S. efforts in combating the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Finally, this paper will provide a summary and recommendation on what U.S. policy should be in dealing with the ICC.
This paper will begin with a discussion and overview of the history and evolution of the ICC, followed by a short synopsis of the jurisdictional procedures of the ICC.
HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
At the conclusion of World War II, war crimes and egregious crimes against humanity committed by Germany and Japan demanded the formation of a War Crimes Tribunal to hold accountable those individuals directly and/or indirectly responsible. As a result of international outcry, the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals were created to justly hold accountable those actors who ordered or were complicit in their actions.
It has been over 50 years since the United Nations first recognized the need to establish an international criminal court to prosecute crimes of genocide. In United Nations Resolution 260 of December 9, 1948 , the General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, "recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required." 3 Article I of the convention defined genocide "as a crime under international law" with Article VI stating that persons charged with genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction." At the same convention, the General Assembly also asked the International Law Commission "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide…"
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In 1951, the International Law Commission concluded that the creation of an international court to try persons charged with genocide and other crimes of similar gravity was both desirable and possible. In 1953, the commission forwarded a draft statute to the United Nations General Assembly for consideration and adoption; however, the Assembly decided to postpone ratification of the statute pending adoption of an approved definition of aggression. An agreement on the definition could not be reached, in large part due to Cold War tensions between the United States and USSR, effectively tabling the resolution for over forty years.
More recently, U.S.-led efforts spurred by events in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo caused the United Nations to establish ad hoc tribunals to deal with crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in those countries. The creation of these ad hoc tribunals provided the impetus and model for the creation of a permanent court whose existence would deter the types of atrocities that occurred in earlier wars and punish guilty actors should deterrence fail. 5 Also during this time, the nation of Trinidad and Tobago initiated requests to the United Nations seeking the formation of an international court. It was widely believed by these lead nations that a permanently standing international court would better serve the international community, serve as a stronger deterrent to such heinous crimes and act more quickly than previous ad hoc war crimes tribunals.
In February 1995, the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), a coalition of over 1000 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), endorsed the need for an ICC by lobbying the United Nations for support. They supported the establishment of an independent international criminal court to hold accountable those individuals / parties complicit in committing crimes against humanity.
On July 17, 1998, a treaty calling for the creation of the first permanent international tribunal for the trial of war crimes and other serious breaches of humanitarian law was proposed in a United Nations conference in Rome attended by 160 countries. This treaty, commonly known as the "Rome Statute" or "Rome Treaty," created the International Criminal Court. All parties to the convention were required to sign the treaty by December 31, 2000 -as did President Clinton -if they wanted to be part of the international process of designing the court and refining the judicial terms and procedures of the ICC. For nearly half a century-almost as long as the United Nations has been in existence -the General Assembly has recognized the need to establish such a court to prosecute and punish persons responsible for crimes such as genocide. Many thought…that the horrors of the Second World War-the camps, the cruelty, the exterminations, the Holocaust-could never happen again. And yet they have. In Cambodia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Rwanda. Our time-this decade-even has shown us that man's capacity for evil knows no limits. Genocide…is now a word of our time, too, a heinous reality that calls for a historic response.
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STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The ICC is composed of the Presidency, the Judiciary Chambers, the Office of the 
PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
It is important to understand the basic procedural rights of the ICC, because it is with some of these jurisdictional claims that the United States has issues. The ICC has the jurisdictional right to prosecute under three conditions: first, when a nation's court is unable to prosecute due to domestic reasons (i.e., civil war, or no judicial process exists); second, when a nation's court refuses or is unwilling to prosecute the case; and finally, when the Court determines that an investigation and/or trial was not conducted in good faith. It is also important to understand that the ICC prosecutes cases regarding egregious crimes by civilian and military leaders and personnel, not nation states, and that the ICC does not take the place of a sovereign state's court. Further, for the ICC to act on any case, its jurisdiction must be accepted by the sovereign state in which the crime was committed or by the state of the nationality of the accused, unless the case is referred by the United Nations Security Council.
Cases are referred to the Court by one of five methods. First, a signatory to the treaty refers the case to the ICC. Second, a country that has ratified the treaty or acknowledges the Court's jurisdiction sends the case to the ICC. Third, the United Nations Security Council refers the case, which is subject to veto by any of the five permanent members -France, Great
Britain, Russia, China and United States. Fourth, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) can refer cases and evidence of crimes to the prosecutor for consideration. Finally, the three judge panel from the Pre-Trial Division approves a case submitted by the ICC Prosecutor.
There is a procedural requirement to determine evidential admissibility. The ICC has several criteria to determine admissibility. The case must have a level of severity commensurate to war crimes. As a matter of procedure, the ICC cannot accept a case if it is being investigated or prosecuted by a sovereign state. The right or protection from 'double jeopardy' is guaranteed by the ICC. A person cannot be tried twice on the same crime(s) if he has already been tried by either his sovereign court or the ICC.
The last step in the judicial process is the prosecutor's decision to proceed with a case.
Trial is by a three-judge panel -not a jury -and the maximum sentence is usually 30 years, although in extreme cases it may be life in prison; the death penalty is not a sentencing option.
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U.S. SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PRINCIPLES
The United States has been a world leader in promoting the rule of law and has been committed to working with the United Nations for the last several years in helping to shape the ICC and the necessary safeguards to prevent politicization of the process. Both the Clinton and
Bush Administrations believe that a properly created court with constitutional guarantees and safeguards similar to those of U.S. courts would be a useful tool in promoting human rights and holding the perpetrators of egregious crimes accountable before the world. The United States position is rooted in the belief that the U.S. system of government was founded on the principle that, in the words of John Adams, "power must never be trusted without a check." The United States founding fathers understood that "unchecked power is subject to abuse, even with the good intentions of those who established it." 15 It was therefore determined by the United States that the Rome Treaty, as written, removed the procedural checks and balances by making the ICC prosecutors and judges answerable to no higher organization or institution other than the court itself. The purported process violates the constitutional guarantees afforded U.S. citizens -the right to trial by one's peers and an appellate process.
These unchecked powers, coupled with U.S. fears of politically motivated prosecution, still remain major stumbling blocks between the United States and the ICC.
There is also U.S. concern over the Court's attempted jurisdiction over non-parties to the 
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There is further concern that the ICC "…could also erode the fundamental elements of the United Nations Charter and the democratic right to self defense." Under treaty guidelines, allies and parties to the treaty would be obligated to detain U.S. That the United States may not cooperate with the ICC, the ICC may not conduct investigations within the United States, the United States will vote in the Security Council to ensure that U.S. armed forces participating in United Nations peacekeeping missions will be exempt from ICC prosecution, the United States may not participate in any peacekeeping missions unless all U.S. armed forces are exempted from prosecutions and each country in which there are U.S. personnel is not a party to the ICC or has a treaty with the U.S exempting U.S. personnel from prosecution, no ICC member state (except NATO counties and other key allies) shall receive U.S. military assistance and finally, the President can use all means necessary and appropriate to release U.S. or Allied personnel detained or imprisoned by the ICC in the Hague. Council for genuine self-interests, could risk U.S. foreign diplomacy, impact future peacekeeping operations and threaten military cooperation -not to mention U.S. credibility."
IMPACT ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING
The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 outlines a number of conditions for the United States to take unilateral action to protect and defend U.S. interests.
The NSS states that…
The United States will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power; defending the United States, the American people and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders…we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country. Another area that could have a lasting effect on U.S. decision makers is the undefined statute regarding the crime of aggression and its potential for political or prosecutorial misuse. States, that may have the ability and capacity to stop atrocities, failure to act, could in itself be a crime prosecutable by the ICC. 44 As a counter point to this U.S. concern, any nationregardless of signatory status -who had the capacity and/or moral duty to intervene could be held liable for non-action.
ALTERNATIVE U.S. POLICY
As highlighted earlier, although the United States gained numerous concessions from the United Nations regarding ICC immunity, and successfully negotiated a number of bilateral agreements with the EU members and many signatories to the Treaty, there are alternative policy options that the United States can pursue in supporting the principles of an international criminal court. The first option is for the United States to remain a non-signatory and pursue a policy of "selective engagement" regarding peacekeeping operations and missions of military cooperation. The second policy option is for the United States to become a re-signatory to the Rome Treaty and fully comply with its provisions.
In analyzing these policy options, it is important to remember the tenets of the Bush Administration's policy regarding the ICC: "blanket" immunity for all U.S. armed forces involved in international peacekeeping operations; the United States' inalienable right to self-defense in prosecuting the GWOT; and the right to use military force to protect and secure its national interests.
In pursuing a policy of "selective engagement," the United States would unilaterally withdraw from all present and future international peacekeeping operations not in the security interest of the United States, unless "blanket" immunity was granted to all U.S. armed forces and selected personnel by the host nation, United Nations, EU or the ICC -this is different from current U.S. policy where it is negotiating terms of immunity with individual nations through bilateral agreements under the auspice of a one year United Nations exemption from ICC prosecution renewed annually as required. This policy, combined with our veto authority in the United Nations Security Council, could help shape the conditions for change to the ICC charter.
This approach would shift peacekeeping responsibility -dollars and resources -from the United
States to other international players who are unwilling to grant U.S. immunity -a price the international community may not be able to afford. It would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to the international community regarding matters of the ICC.
The danger of this kind of policy is twofold. First, the United States could become less of a player in the shaping of international affairs. It could be perceived as an international "bully" holding peacekeeping missions hostage to U.S. demands for immunity and putting our selfinterests ahead of the needs of the international community. Second, it could undermine or jeopardize U.S. international efforts -coalitions and cooperation -to deploy forces abroad to fight and prosecute the GWOT.
The other policy option is for the United States to become a re-signatory to the Rome Treaty -assuming it passes the U.S. Senate. This would obviously make the United States a latecomer to shaping the court and bound to the ICC, bringing to bear the many U.S. concerns outlined earlier in the paper. In light of the concerns of the Bush Administration, however, there are some advantages to this policy. First, it might allow the United States to become an active player and possible leader in promoting change in the ICC, vice being an observer with no voice and no vote. It could enable change to be made that would alleviate many U.S. concerns with the ICC. It might also exempt the United States from possible prosecution from the undefined crime of aggression and new crimes that could be added later by the Assembly. Second, it would demonstrate U.S. resolve and goodwill in promoting the internationally accepted body of law. Finally, the ICC membership would bolster U.S. legitimacy in international affairs.
Although both policy options may appear logically viable and sound in the court of public opinion, and could provide U.S. leverage to influence change in the Court, these advantages do not outweigh the current Bush Administration's concerns and stated disadvantages in dealing with the ICC. The problem with both policy options is that they do not address the United
States' core issues -constitutional rights and protection of national security -nor do they provide for the same immunity guarantees secured under the current policy. As highlighted earlier, both the Clinton and Bush Administrations had issues with the statutory authority of the ICC. The fundamental judicial issue is that the ICC does not offer the same constitutional guarantees afforded U.S. citizens, specifically trial by jury, checks and balances of the Court's authority, and appeal to a higher appellate court -cases are appealed from the Trial Division to the Appeals Division within the ICC with no judicial oversight from the United Nations.
Regarding matters of U.S. national security, the ICC could attempt to exercise greater jurisdictional authority over the United States -as a signatory -for its decision to use military force in fighting global terrorism, enforcing peacekeeping operations and/or conducting military operations in Iraq. It could also hold the United States to a higher legal standard for any preemptive or unilateral action it may take in pursuit of national interests, especially if this action lacks international support.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Bush Administration has been severely berated by many domestic and international critics for its isolationist approach in dealing with the ICC. Many European allies and some American critics worry that the Administration's "attitude will lead to more instability around the world and intensify resentment at what is perceived as U.S. unilateralism." 45 Many international scholars and lawyers, critical of the United States' unsigning of the treaty, claim that U.S. fears of political prosecution are remote and unfounded. In the U.S. Senate, Senator Chris Dodd, an opponent of the Administration's handling of the treaty, said "some in the United States harbor the unreasonable fear that Americans will be taken before this tribunal on politically motivated charges, fears that I believe are unfounded but fears that have not been dispelled with the erasing of our signature…whether we signed it or not, it is becoming the international rule of law." 46 Despite the assertions of these critics, ample evidence exists that the Administration's concerns are legitimate and real, and that their concerns will have a sobering effect on U.S.
national security decision making.
The Bush Administration's policy approach not only protects U.S. citizens from potential ICC prosecution, it also promotes and preserves our national interests abroad by providing us diplomatic and military flexibility in shaping our engagement strategy. The United States needs to stay the course on its current policy but continue to engage the international community in the U.N. and through diplomatic channels to resolve differences regarding matters of the ICC. The
United States needs to strike a balance between U.S. self-interests and international needs, especially if it wants to maintain its viability in the international community. The sobering reality of U.S. policy is that there will be many in the United Nations that will always see the United
States as a unilateralist bully protecting and promoting its self-centered interests at the expense of the international community and the ICC.
Word Count -7,767
